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McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
The Sierra Club petitions for review of the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s approval of new 
Pennsylvania National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
(NAAQS). The proposed standards govern pollution output at 
coal-burning power plants in the Commonwealth. The Sierra 
Club argues that the standards wrongly claim to reduce 
pollution output at Pennsylvania’s most advanced plants while 
simply rubberstamping an average of current pollution output 
as its supposed new gold standard. Further, the Sierra Club 
criticizes the proposal’s minimum temperature threshold—a 
measure that allows plants to nearly quintuple their pollution 
output when operating below 600 degrees Fahrenheit—as 
unsupported and unsupportable given the technical record 
before the agency. Finally, the Sierra Club claims that the 
approved standards lack enforceable reporting regulations. 
Because we agree that the regulatory regime which springs 
forth from these three defining characteristics is neither 
supported by adequate facts nor by reasoning found in the 
administrative record, we hold that the EPA’s approval was 
arbitrary and capricious. We will therefore grant the petition 
for review and remand to the agency with instructions that it 
develop enforceable pollution controls in accordance with its 
legal obligations. 
 
I. 
 
This dispute is governed by the Clean Air Act which 
gives Circuit Courts of Appeals original jurisdiction to review 
the EPA’s approval of a state’s proposed pollution standards.1 
CAA is a model of cooperative federalism. Indeed, that 
philosophy has been described as the Act’s “core principle.”2 
Thus, although the EPA is charged with setting the NAAQS,3 
 
1 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1).   
2 Miss. Comm’n on Envtl. Quality v. E.P.A., 790 F.3d 138, 
156 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting E.P.A. v. EME Homer City 
Generation, L.P., 572 U.S. 489, 511 n.14 (2014)). 
3 See 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a) (directing the EPA to list “air 
pollutants” whose emissions “cause or contribute to air 
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger 
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the individual states are afforded discretion in the planning and 
implementation of plans to achieve the EPA’s goals for 
reduction in air pollutants.4 
 
One such pollutant is ground level ozone, which is not 
a naturally occurring compound. This ozone is the result of a 
chemical reaction that occurs when power plants and industrial 
boilers mix nitrogen oxides (NOx) with the organic 
compounds they are emitting as air pollution.5 It is similar to 
the process that creates most anthropogenic (i.e., human 
produced) ozone, which primarily arises from the “photolysis 
of nitrogen dioxide by sunlight, occurring in the presence of 
hydrocarbons.”6 
A. Relevant standards and history 
This dispute has its beginnings in the EPA’s 2008 
revision to its 1997 ozone National Standard. There, the EPA 
tightened the cap on ozone pollution to an average of 75 parts-
per-billion over an 8-hour period (the previous standards had 
permitted 80 parts-per-billion7).8 Seventeen counties around 
 
public health or welfare”); 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a)-(b) (for such 
listed air pollutants, EPA must set “ambient air quality 
standards the attainment and maintenance of which . . . are 
requisite to protect the public health” with an “adequate 
margin of safety”). 
4 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410, 7502. 
5 E.P.A., Ground-level Ozone Basics, 
https://www.epa.gov/ground-level-ozone-pollution/ground-
level-ozone-basics. 
6 Peter J. A. Rombout, et al., Rationale for an Eight-Hour 
Ozone Standard, 36 J. OF THE AIR POLLUTION CONTROL 
ASSOC. 913, 913 (1986), 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00022470.1986.10466130. 
7 EPA Proposes New National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
for Ozone, 20 No. 3 AIR POLLUTION CONSULTANT 2.12, 2.13 
(2010). 
8 73 Fed. Reg. 16,436 (Mar. 27, 2008). This 8-hour averaging 
period allows for variation in emissions throughout the day. 
Since 1997, the EPA has accepted such 8-hour averages for 
ozone emissions, and has judged compliance based on the 
fourth-highest (i.e., lowest) daily maximum from each 8-hour 
window, averaged over three years. 20 No. 3 AIR POLLUTION 
CONSULTANT at 2.13. 
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Philadelphia and Pittsburgh were unable to achieve the new 
2008 requirements for pollution control.9 Accordingly, the 
Commonwealth was required to design a state implementation 
plan (SIP) for its major sources of NOx and volatile organic 
compounds.10 Power plants are one of the most significant 
sources of these pollutants, and were therefore most directly 
impacted by these proposals.  
 
Pennsylvania’s proposal had to satisfy Reasonably 
Available Control Technology (RACT) requirements.11 RACT 
is a technology-forcing standard designed to induce 
improvements and reductions in pollution for existing sources. 
It is a term of art at the foundation of the EPA’s decision-
making, but is not defined in the Clean Air Act.12 The EPA 
itself originally defined this standard in internal guidance as 
requiring “the toughest controls considering technological and 
economic feasibility that can be applied to a specific situation 
. . .  [a]nything less than this is by definition less than RACT.”13 
Because the parties do not dispute this long-standing 
definition, we assume without deciding that the EPA’s 
definition is correct. Therefore, RACT is “the lowest emission 
limitation that a particular source is capable of meeting by the 
application of control technology that is reasonably available 
considering technological and economic feasibility.”14 
 
9 Pennsylvania DEP, “Attainment Status by Principal 
Pollutants,” 
http://www.dep.pa.gov/Business/Air/BAQ/Regulations/Pages
/Attainment-Status.aspx. 
10 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7511c(a), 7502(c)(1). 
11 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(1) (imposing the RACT requirement). 
12 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(1). See also Natural Res. Def. Council, 
Inc. v. E.P.A., 571 F.3d 1245, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (finding 
“reasonably available control technology” under the Clean 
Air Act to be ambiguous).  
13 Memorandum from Roger Strelow, Assistant Admin. for 
Air and Waste Mgmt., U.S. E.P.A., to Regional Admins., 
Regions I - X, at 2-3 (Dec. 9, 1976), 
https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/naaqs/aqmguide/collection/cp2/197
61209_strelow_ract.pdf.  
14 E.P.A., State Implementation Plans; Nitrogen Oxides 
Supplement to the General Preamble for the Implementation 
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Pennsylvania calls the SIP’s implementation of that standard 
the RACT II Rule, as it is a second generation approach (since 
RACT must be reconsidered at each NAAQS revision).15  
 
RACT is not designed to rubber-stamp existing control 
methods. It is a technology-forcing mechanism. When 
originally introducing the standard, the EPA noted that “the 
control agency, using the available guidance, should select the 
best available controls, deviating from those controls only 
where local conditions are such that they cannot be applied 
there and imposing even tougher controls where conditions 
allow.”16 
 
Thus, in order to satisfy RACT, a proposed SIP must 
satisfy both technological and economic feasibility. The EPA 
explains, “[t]he technological feasibility of applying an 
emission reduction method to a particular source should 
consider the source’s process and operating procedures, raw 
materials, physical plant layout, and any other environmental 
impacts such as water pollution, waste disposal, and energy 
 
of Title I of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 57 Fed. 
Reg. 55,620, 55,624/3 (proposed Nov. 25, 1992); Navistar 
Intern. Transp. Corp. v. E.P.A., 941 F.2d 1339, 1343 (6th Cir. 
1991) (“Since 1976, the EPA has interpreted reasonably 
available control technology to be the lowest emission 
limitation that a particular source is capable of meeting by the 
application of control technology that is reasonably available 
considering technological and economic feasibility.”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); Washington Envtl. 
Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1137 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(describing same description of the standard adopted into 
state law as part of an EPA-approved SIP). 
15 JA38; see also JA247 (“The evaluation or reevaluation of 
what constitutes RACT-level control for affected sources is a 
requirement that must be fulfilled each time the EPA 
promulgates a new NAAQS . . .”). For clarity, given the 
potential for confusion between the general RACT approach 
and Pennsylvania’s specific implementation here, dubbed 
RACT II, we refer to the proposed changes as the SIP 
whenever possible. 
16 Memorandum from Roger Strelow, supra n.10. 
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requirements.”17 Whereas the economic feasibility “considers 
the cost of reducing emissions and the difference in costs 
between the particular source and other similar sources that 
have implemented emission reduction.”18 When calculating the 
cost, the EPA has previously cautioned: “Economic feasibility 
rests very little on the ability of a particular source to ‘afford’ 
to reduce emissions to the level of similar sources. Less 
efficient sources would be rewarded by having to bear lower 
emission reduction costs if affordability were given high 
consideration. Rather, economic feasibility . . . is largely 
determined by evidence that other sources in a source category 
have in fact applied the control technology in question.”19 
 
A key technological element of this discussion is the 
development of selective catalytic reduction (SCR). SCR 
originated in the 1970s and is currently a preferred method for 
limiting coal-fired power plant pollution. More than 300 coal 
power plants in the U.S. feature the technology.20 SCR can, 
potentially, remove up to 100% of the ozone pollution 
produced by a plant. However, most systems are only designed 
for 90% reduction. By comparison, another potential pollution 
control, SNCR, achieves 25-75% reductions.21 The SCR 
process involves injecting a substance such as ammonia or urea 
as a catalyst into the post-combustion flue gas. That causes the 
harmful NOx pollution to break down into its component 
nitrogen and water molecules and to be dispersed as vapor.22 
 
Plants that are unable to meet specified pollution limits 
are allowed to average their emissions with other plants of the 
 
17 E.P.A., State Implementation Plans; General Preamble for 
the Implementation of Title I of the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1990; Supplemental, 57 Fed. Reg. 18,070, 
18,073 (proposed Apr. 28, 1992) (first introducing RACT as a 
standard to regulate emissions from existing sources). 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 JA108. 
21 Id. 
22 E.P.A., Air Pollution Control Technology Fact Sheet at 3, 
https://www3.epa.gov/ttncatc1/dir1/fscr.pdf. 
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same owner or operator to comply with the limits.23 A plant is 
also permitted under section 129.99 of the RACT II Rule to 
request an alternative RACT limit that applies only to its own 
facility. These are called “source-specific RACT limits.”24 It is 
important to stress that the overall RACT limit is therefore not 
a hard cap if certain older plants could not otherwise satisfy the 
requirements. 
B. The Pennsylvania proposal 
Pennsylvania’s SIP was submitted in May 2016.25 It 
proposed that NOx emission limits for SCR-equipped coal-
fired power plants operating at 600 degrees or higher be 
required to emit less than 0.12 pounds of NOx per million 
British Thermal Units (MMBtu) (a unit of heat).26 Yet when 
SCR-equipped boilers operate below 600 degrees Fahrenheit, 
a higher limit between 0/16 and 0.4 lb/MMBtu limit would be 
permitted.27 Pennsylvania had originally not offered any 
reduced limit on SCR-equipped facilities but added these 
provisions (and an accompanying temperature exception, 
discussed below) in response to critical feedback from the 
EPA, which suggested a 0.12 lb/MMBtu limit for such plants.28 
 
In March 2018, the EPA provisionally approved 
Pennsylvania’s proposal.29 A number of groups opposed it. 
They expressed particular concern over the regulations for 
coal-fired combustion plants, which generate a large 
percentage of Pennsylvania’s emissions.30 Surrounding states 
opposed Pennsylvania’s proposal and submitted negative 
public comments during the ensuing comment period.  
 
For instance, New York took issue with the EPA’s 
claim that the Pennsylvania limits were “comparable to NOx 
 
23 JA39. The other plants must be subject to the same NOx 
presumptive limits and be at the same facility or within the 
same nonattainment area. Id. 
24 Id. 
25 JA26. 
26 25 Pa. Code § 129.97(g)(1)(viii). 
27 Id. § 129.97(g)(1)(vi)(C). 
28 JA330. 
29 JA26. 
30 JA47-52. 
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emission limitations in other states.”31 New York compared its 
own limits to those proposed by Pennsylvania and argued that 
its limits were “more stringent nearly across the board.”32 
According to New York, Pennsylvania was proposing limits 
that were “comparable to limits that were effective in New 
York from 1995 to 2014.”33 
 
New York argued that the EPA’s finding that 
Pennsylvania’s proposal was comparable to New York and 
Connecticut ignored the fact that both states are partway 
through a multi-year emission limit reduction plan.  Additional 
substantial reductions are already completed in Connecticut 
and expected in New York by 2023.34 Finally, New York 
criticized the relatively lenient 30-day averaging of pollution 
proposed by Pennsylvania. New York, by contrast, requires a 
24-hour average, which the state claimed prevents emitters 
from relying on the month-long average to balance out days 
when they do not use pollution control mechanisms.35 
 
Maryland also opposed Pennsylvania’s proposal. It 
argued: “all of Pennsylvania’s coal-fired boilers equipped with 
SCR have demonstrated that they can achieve NOx emission 
rates far below 0.12 lb/MMBtu, including hours where the 
SCR inlet temperature may be lower than 600 F.”36 Maryland 
noted that the proposed limits were “on average, nearly 60% 
higher than what they have achieved in the past.”37 The 
submission included data showing that all of Pennsylvania’s 
powerplants were capable of emissions lower than the 
proposed limit, down to as low as 0.043 lb/MMBtu.38 
C. Petitioner’s critiques 
 
The Sierra Club offered even more pointed criticism. It 
submitted lengthy comments against the proposal. In 
particular, the Sierra Club used data from the EPA’s own 
 
31 JA351. 
32 JA352. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 JA354. 
37 JA355. 
38 Id. 
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sources to demonstrate that at least some of Pennsylvania’s 
plants have historically been able to emit NOx at 50% of the 
proposed limit.39 The Sierra Club also argued that other 
neighboring states have not received a temperature threshold 
for their plants. It is therefore not at all clear why it is 
appropriate or reasonable for Pennsylvania to be given one. 
This is particularly important because the Sierra Club provided 
evidence regarding at least one Pennsylvania plant showing 
that it has operated below the proposed limit (600 degrees) in 
the past.40 Lastly, the Sierra Club complained that the 
Pennsylvania proposal failed to require plants to report their 
temperature records. There would be no reliable method for 
monitoring whether plants were even complying with these 
emission limits. Consequently, a plant could explain away 
higher emissions by claiming it was operating below 600 
degrees at the time, without having to substantiate that claim. 
The combination of this lack of mandatory reporting and the 
temperature waiver created a potent loophole for polluters to 
walk through.41 
 
Despite these concerns, the EPA eventually gave the 
Pennsylvania plan formal approval in 2019.42 Within the 60-
day statutory window to contest that decision, the Sierra Club 
filed the present petition for review.43  
 
II. 
 
The EPA had jurisdiction to review and approve 
Pennsylvania’s SIP.44 The SIP is “locally or regionally 
applicable” within the Third Circuit.45  Accordingly, we have 
 
39 JA336-41. 
40 JA341-45 (modeling temperatures and pollution at the 
Cheswick plant). This data suggests that Cheswick would be 
able to evade the 0.12 lb/MMBtu limit by operating at lower 
temperatures, as it has in the past. 
41 JA345-46 
42 JA7. 
43 See 84 Fed. Reg. 20,274 (May 9, 2019) (JA007); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7607(b)(1). 
44 JA028; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 7502, 7410(k). 
45 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1).  
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jurisdiction to review the EPA’s final approval of the 
Commonwealth’s proposal. 
A. Standard of Review 
 
We accord due deference to a final EPA action, in light 
of the agency’s expertise. We will remand only when the 
agency’s decision “[i]s ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.’”46 
 
But to receive such deference, the agency cannot reach 
whatever conclusion it likes and then defend it with vague 
allusions to its own expertise; instead, the agency must support 
its conclusion with demonstrable reasoning based on the facts 
in the record. When it fails to do so, an agency action is 
arbitrary and capricious—examples include the agency 
“entirely fail[ing] to consider an important aspect of the 
problem.”47 Or offering only a “conclusory statement” which 
“failed to articulate a rational basis for its conclusion.”48 Or 
indeed if “cit[ing] no data whatsoever in support of its 
decision.”49 We have held that “courts are ‘not obliged to stand 
aside and rubber-stamp their affirmance of administrative 
decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate 
 
46 Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. E.P.A., 803 F.3d 151, 
158 (3d Cir. 2015) (internal citation omitted). This is 
illustrated, for example, in Berks County v. E.P.A., an 
unpublished 2015 decision, where we denied a petition for 
review because we found the EPA had considered all the data 
and made a reasonable decision. 619 Fed. Appx. 179, 184 (3d 
Cir. 2015). 
47 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); see, e.g., E. Bay Sanctuary 
Covenant v. Barr, 964 F.3d 832, 857 (9th Cir. 2020) 
(remanding an agency action because it “entirely failed to 
consider an important aspect of the problem”) (citing 463 
U.S. at 43); Sierra Club, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 897 F.3d 
582, 605 (4th Cir. 2018) (same); Genuine Parts Co. v. E.P.A., 
890 F.3d 304, 341 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (same). 
48 W.R. Grace & Co. v. E.P.A., 261 F.3d 330, 342 (3d Cir. 
2001). 
49 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. E.P.A., 790 F.2d 289, 
309 (3d Cir. 1986). 
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or that frustrate the congressional policy underlying a 
statute.’”50  
 
However, we cannot “substitute [our] judgment for that 
of the agency.”51 We will therefore defer to the agency’s 
expertise if we can discern “a rational connection between the 
facts found and the choice made.”52 Even when “[a]n agency 
has engaged in line-drawing determinations” we review 
primarily to determine whether the result is “‘patently 
unreasonable’ or run[s] counter to the evidence before the 
agency.”53 
B. Standing 
 
We briefly consider standing, and find it is satisfied 
here. The Sierra Club asserts that it holds standing based on the 
interests of its members.54 It describes the particular impact 
increased pollution will have on the health and enjoyment of 
its members, who prioritize outdoor activities (and, 
presumably, good health). To have standing in an 
environmental case, “[t]he relevant showing . . . is not injury 
to the environment but injury to the plaintiff.”55 Standing exists 
where “(1) [the plaintiff] . . . has suffered an ‘injury in fact’ 
that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or 
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is 
fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and 
(3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury 
will be redressed by a favorable decision.”56 When, as here, an 
association sues on behalf of its membership, it may do so 
when “the interests at stake are germane to the organization's 
 
50 Pa. Fed’n of Sportsmen’s Clubs, Inc. v. Kempthorne, 497 
F.3d 337, 347 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Nat’l Labor Relations 
Bd. v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291 (1965)). 
51 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 43. 
52 Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 389–90 
(3d Cir. 2004), as amended (June 3, 2016) (quoting State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. at 43). 
53 Id. at 390 (quoting Sinclair Broad. Grp. Inc. v. FCC, 284 
F.3d 148, 162 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
54 Pet. Br. at 16-18. 
55 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), 
Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000). 
56 Id. at 180-81. 
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purpose, and neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested 
requires the participation of individual members in the 
lawsuit.”57 
 
The Sierra Club’s claim here is sufficiently 
particularized to satisfy the Supreme Court’s test from 
Laidlaw.58 There, the Court accepted statements similar to the 
ones Petitioner makes here that the direct interests of its 
members were at stake. The Court held that this imminent harm 
was distinct from the theoretical future interest in visiting 
remote destinations threatened with environmental harm 
rejected as insufficient in Lujan.59 The Sierra Club describes 
the negative impact of ozone pollution on the health and 
recreational opportunities available to its members.60 When, as 
here, the complaint demonstrates such an actual harm that will 
“directly affect[] those affiants’ recreational, aesthetic, and 
economic interests,” standing is satisfied.61 
 
III. 
 
The Sierra Club challenges the EPA’s approval of the 
Pennsylvania SIP on the three grounds described in their public 
comments above. We consider each in turn: the selection of a 
0.12 NOx/MMBtu pollution limit instead of a stricter 
requirement; the 600-degree temperature threshold; and the 
lack of a reporting requirement on power plant inlet 
temperatures. While the reasoning supporting each element is 
questionable individually, joined together they are decidedly 
worse than the sum of their parts. Working in tandem, these 
three elements spawn a pernicious loophole centered on the 
 
57 Id. at 181 (citing Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advert. 
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)). 
58 528 U.S. at 183–84. 
59 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992). 
60 JA332 (discussing health consequences which particularly 
affect children and those with asthma, and environmental 
damage including visible injury to trees and vegetation). 
61 528 U.S. at 184. Cf. Sierra Club v. E.P.A., 754 F.3d 995, 
1000-02 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (finding the Sierra Club lacked 
standing when it alleged merely speculative harm from 
potential future changes to clear air policies). 
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600-degree threshold, one which would easily permit operators 
to exceed the 0.12 NOx/MMBtu cap. 
A. 0.12 NOx/MMBtu Limit 
 
The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental 
Protection (DEP) has freely admitted that its requested 0.12 
NOx/MMBtu pollution limit “is not the lowest achievable 
emissions rate (LAER) for this technology.”62 It correctly notes 
that satisfying RACT is not the same thing as meeting LAER.63 
This is obvious since LAER applies only to new sources, 
whereas RACT is a technology forcing standard for existing 
polluters.64 Thus, DEP ignores the obvious possibility that an 
existing source can both fall short of LAER and also fail to 
satisfy RACT. 
 
Nonetheless, the EPA and DEP argue that RACT need 
not be the best possible emissions limit; it must be the best limit 
that is also economically and technically achievable for plant 
operators. That general proposition is certainly correct. 
However, it fails when applied to this record. Here, DEP itself 
analyzed the pollution reduction capabilities of five different 
plants and found that three are already capable of meeting the 
0.12 lb/MMBtu limits with little or no changes.65 One, Homer 
City, has committed to updating its SCR systems to meet that 
standard.66 But a fourth, Cheswick, is currently operating well 
above the limit (from 0.21 to 0.22 lb/MMBtu).67 0.12 
lb/MMBtu was selected as it represents the average pollution 
output of the three plants that are already compliant over the 
last five years.68 Suffice to say, an average of the current 
 
62 JA247 
63 Id. 
64 Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 
1224, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting that LAER applies to 
“new sources in nonattainment areas” whereas RACT 
governs “existing sources in nonattainment areas”). 
65 JA325. 
66 Id. 
67 JA329. 
68 Id. 
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emissions being generated by existing systems, will not usually 
be sufficient to satisfy the RACT standard.69 
 
The EPA seeks to explain this 0.12 lb/MMBtu choice 
by observing that power needs fluctuate between winter and 
summer, so using data from only part of the year is not 
necessarily reflective of the overall pollution possible on a 
yearly basis. But this simply ignores the fact that by averaging 
current emissions over five years, the 0.12 lb/MMBtu result 
already accounts for seasonal variation.70  
 
Moreover, the DEP data in the record appears to simply 
average the net emissions rate of each plant, without 
considering these facilities’ widely varying actual output of 
pollutants. For example, the DEP data purports to give Unit 2 
at both Keystone (0.09 lb/MMBtu emissions) and Montour 
(0.15 lb/MMBtu) equal weighting in its average (for a 30-day 
average of 0.12 lb/MMBtu between the two Units). But this 
record suggests that Keystone Unit 2 is normally operating at 
higher capacity than Montour Unit 2—in June 2003, for 
instance, Keystone Unit 2 produced 128.8 tons of NOx 
emissions, whereas Montour Unit 2 produced only 74.9 tons.71 
An equal weighting thus distorts the real-world emissions 
rates. In the example above, the correctly weighted average 
rate would have been 0.112 lb/MMBtu, below the 
unconvincing 0.12 lb/MMBtu proposal. 
 
Even more disquieting, the EPA ignores its own Air 
Markets Program Data showing that all five Pennsylvania 
power plants noted above have actually achieved much greater 
reductions than 0.12 NOx/MMBtu during at least 150 months 
that Sierra Club identifies (0.07 NOx/MMBtu or lower average 
in those months).72 The EPA claims that other unspecified 
plants may perform worse than these five, but since this 
limitation applies only to SCR-equipped plants, the five plants 
under consideration (Cheswick, Montour, Keystone, Bruce 
 
69 See Navistar Intern. Transp. Corp., 941 F.2d at 1343 
(reiterating that RACT must be, “the lowest emission 
limitation that a particular source is capable of meeting . . .”). 
70 JA329. 
71 JA337. 
72 JA336-39. 
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Mansfield, and Homer City) represent the vast majority of the 
regulated sites in Pennsylvania.73 The EPA fails to specify 
whether or how these five units are unrepresentative of 
Pennsylvania’s SCR-equipped coal-fired plants, aside from 
speculating that they may be. 
 
Indeed, the EPA itself acknowledges that the 
Pennsylvania plants are capable of achieving better than 0.12 
NOx/MMBtu. It relies on data from 2011, 2015, and 2016, 
when, on average, the year-long average pollution across 
Pennsylvania power plants equipped with SCR was 0.107 
lb/MMBtu.74 While the EPA uses this data to support the 
marginally higher 0.12 lb/MMBtu standard, it provides no 
explanation for setting RACT at a higher level than 0.107 
lb/MMBtu.  It has already been shown that the latter lower 
level is readily achievable on a yearly average.  
 
Furthermore, the Sierra Club demonstrates that the 
EPA’s baseline data from 2011, 2015, and 2016 is not 
necessarily reflective of the lowest possible emissions 
averages. In fact, those non-consecutive chosen years happen 
to be among the highest emission years in recent records.75 For 
example, the modern Seward Generation plant in New 
Florence, PA, which touts itself as the largest waste coal-fired 
power plant in the world and was constructed in 2004,76 
produced its highest emission count on record in 2011, and 
nearly equaled that in 2015.77 By contrast, emissions were 
lower by 10% in 2012 (0.092 instead of 0.103 in 2011).78 
Further, as the Sierra Club stresses, those levels were 
achieved voluntarily. They were not the result of any coercive 
RACT regulations. Absent any regulatory pressure 
 
73 Or. Arg. Trans. at 5-6. Only 14% of large Pennsylvania 
plants are equipped with SCR. JA053. It was also revealed at 
oral argument that this limited number has since fallen 
further: the Bruce Mansfield plant was decommissioned in 
2019. Or. Arg. Trans. at 5. 
74 JA55 n.26. 
75 JA340. 
76 Seward Generation Power Plant, 
https://robindale.energy/seward-generation. 
77 JA340. 
78 Id. 
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whatsoever, the plants were able to operate at limits lower than 
those in Pennsylvania’s SIP.79 Thus, the EPA’s apparent 
supposition that a limit below 0.12 lb/MMBtu was not feasible 
is not only unsupported by this record, but actually 
contradicted by it.  
 
The agency suggests that even if the five plants cited 
could achieve a lower limit, other unspecified facilities might 
not be able to. This position is even less compelling after it was 
revealed at oral argument that the SCR-equipped facilities in 
the state are primarily just the five plants under consideration.80 
The EPA’s reliance on the supposed inability of other unnamed 
facilities, for which it has provided no data or details, is not 
helpful. Moreover, even if a RACT standard was unachievable 
by a particular older plant, that plant could take advantage of a 
“source-specific RACT,” which eases requirements for a 
specific facility that is unable to comply with pollution 
controls.81 
 
Finally, the EPA’s technical report on the Pennsylvania 
plan for emissions does provide some guidance for expected 
emissions levels from coal-fired boilers.82  However, the fact 
that this data is based on EPA research dating back to 1994 is 
relegated to an accompanying footnote, in which the agency 
quietly concedes, “[i]t is possible that further technological 
advancements may have been proven to result in lower NOx 
emissions levels than those reported [here].”83  
 
Given this concession by the agency that technological 
advances may allow for a more environmentally friendly 
standard than the one approved here, reliance on a study that is 
more than two-and-a-half decades old is neither a persuasive 
nor reasonable basis for adopting the higher standard it is 
urging upon us now.84 
 
 
79 Id. 
80 Or. Arg. Trans. at 5-6. 
81 JA68-69. 
82 JA55. 
83 Id. at n.25. 
84 JA10. 
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Indeed, nearby states’ data demonstrate the progress 
that has been made in the intervening decades. Maryland, for 
instance, requires its SCR-equipped plants to adhere to a 0.09 
NOx/MMBtu limit.85 Further, as noted above, Maryland 
indicates that 0.12 NOx/MMBtu was “nearly 60% higher” than 
the emissions limits Pennsylvania’s plants “have achieved in 
the past.”86  
 
In response, the EPA contends that Pennsylvania’s 
limits are comparable to some other states. They may be, and 
we do not suggest that Pennsylvania must achieve the absolute 
lowest level of emissions that is technologically possible for 
the approved limit to satisfy RACT.  However, there is an 
important distinction that the agency’s assertion ignores. The 
0.12 lb/MMBtu limit applies only to SCR-equipped plants—in 
other words, the most technologically advanced facilities in the 
state.87 It is therefore simply not reasonable for the EPA to 
attempt to justify its approval of the higher rate by comparing 
it with the general pollution limitations in other states. Those 
other states are regulating all their coal-fired plants, rather than 
separating out their SCR-equipped facilities. This makes 
Pennsylvania’s lax limit of 0.12 lb/MMBtu even less justifiable 
on this record. As we have noted, those more efficient limits 
apply only to a handful of its most modern plants. Thus, the 
EPA’s approval of Pennsylvania’s more lenient pollution 
levels cannot be explained by the fact that that some 
unspecified “other” plants may not be able to attain a lower 
limit. This is particularly true since the EPA’s own data clearly 
establishes the contrary for nearly all of the SCR-equipped 
plants in the state, and does so in years with higher than 
average emissions. 
 
As the EPA’s own data demonstrates, a lower limit 
would clearly have been practicable. We realize, of course, that 
“mere” data alone may not require a particular result. However, 
the EPA is able neither to offer a reasonable justification for 
failing to require a stricter standard, nor to justify the standard 
it endorsed. That standard represents a mere acceptance of the 
status quo. 
 
85 JA355. 
86 Id. 
87 JA56. 
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We confronted a similar challenge to the EPA’s 
approval of a Pennsylvania SIP proposal (brought by a 
coalition of environmental groups, including the Sierra Club) 
in 2015.88 There, the underlying data and analysis conducted 
by Pennsylvania were clearly inadequate. For example, it 
failed to consider the cumulative impact of multiple pollution 
sources, rather than each individually. Moreover, even the EPA 
agreed that the Commonwealth’s proposal contained “systemic 
deficiencies,” and that it should have done more review.89 
Despite that very appropriate concession, the agency 
nevertheless approved the SIP. It claimed to have done so 
because the conclusions were at worst harmless error.90 
However, approving the proposed standards without sufficient 
explanation was not “harmless” at all. Rather, we stated that 
the error of relying on an admittedly faulty analysis was a 
bridge too far: “the EPA has identified a host of problems with 
Pennsylvania's . . . analysis. What it has not done, however, is 
provide a sufficient explanation as to why it overlooked these 
problems and approved Pennsylvania’s SIP.”91 Despite the 
deference appropriately afforded to agency determinations of 
these issues, we found it necessary to remand “[b]ecause we, 
as a reviewing court, need an agency to show its work before 
we can accept its conclusions . . .”92  
 
The same is true here. Without any basis for justifying 
their selection of a 0.12 lb/MMBtu limit, and evidence that a 
lower limit was practicable, Respondents struggle to meet even 
our deferential standard of review. Our deference to agency 
expertise is not a blank check allowing the EPA to act 
arbitrarily, nor does it give the EPA a pass on having to explain 
how its proposed limit is consistent with RACT. Here, the EPA 
has failed to adequately explain how and why a 0.12 lb/MMBtu 
limit is permissible on this record. Although it has offered 
vague allusions to the inability of unspecified plants to meet a 
 
88 Natl. Parks Conserv. Ass’n v. E.P.A., 803 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 
2015). 
89 Id. at 165–67. 
90 Id. at 166. 
91 Id. at 167. 
92 Id. 
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lower standard, the agency has deprived us of the ability to 
review its decision by “show[ing] its work.”93  
B. 600-Degree Temperature 
Threshold 
 
The EPA’s questionable reasoning above is badly 
compounded by the agency’s simultaneous approval of a 600-
degree threshold for SCR use. Taken together with the 
reporting requirements discussed below, approval of this 
regulatory scheme was clearly arbitrary and capricious. 
 
Regarding the threshold, neither the EPA nor DEP can 
explain why it is necessary at all. It is not a common 
exemption.94 Moreover, even assuming such a temperature 
threshold were reasonable, the record does not support the 
conclusion that 600 degrees Fahrenheit is the proper limit. The 
EPA instead justifies the threshold by observing that SCR 
controls become increasingly less effective at lower 
temperatures.95 We readily accept that nearly all chemical 
reactions occur with greater efficiency at higher 
temperatures—this is merely a rote application of the 
Arrhenius Equation (which maintains that “reaction rates 
depend on the . . . temperature”96). However, that does not by 
itself justify approving higher pollution levels at cooler 
operating temperatures because the ill effects of running SCR 
at low temperatures are temporary or easily reversed.97 For 
instance, a higher rate of accumulation of the by-products 
(primarily ammonium bisulfate) at an increased rate at lower 
temperatures can be readily reversed when the plant reverts to 
 
93 Id. The agency should also have specifically analyzed the 
30-day averaging that Pennsylvania’s plan entails, which is 
longer than neighboring states’ averaging periods during the 
ozone season. Response Br. at 32-33. 
94 According to the record, other states have not requested 
such a threshold in their SIP proposals. JA343. 
95 JA54. 
96 JOHN C. KOTZ, ET AL., CHEMISTRY AND CHEMICAL 
REACTIVITY 696 (7th ed. 2009). 
97 JA343. 
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normal temperatures during the daytime, or peak hours.98 The 
EPA failed to consider the practicality of such remedies to 
lower temperature operation, despite the fact, as discussed 
below, that SCR controls routinely operate well below 600 
degrees.99 
 
DEP attempts to bolster the threshold requirement by 
pointing to a response it gave during the public comment 
period.100 However, while that response defends a 600-degree 
limit, it is contrary to record evidence. The DEP had noted:  
“While the minimum operating temperature 
varies depending on the type of SCR system, 
typically for the SCR to function at its target 
efficiency rate and optimize the control of NOx 
emissions, the temperature of the EGU flue gas 
entering the SCR must be no less than 600°F. 
When the EGU flue gas temperature falls below 
600°F, less efficient NOx emission reduction 
occurs along with increased ammonia slip and 
increased potential for air heater fouling leading 
to unscheduled outages.”101 
 
The EPA relies upon this to argue “Pennsylvania 
determined that SCR controls cannot result in lower NOx 
emissions rates when operating below the temperature 
threshold.”102 Yet, in making that argument, the EPA fails to 
explain why operating below SCR’s “target efficiency rate,” as 
DEP explains would occur below 600 degrees, means that SCR 
“cannot result in lower NOx emissions.” That inference simply 
does not naturally follow, and the agency impermissibly leaves 
us to puzzle how it reached its conclusion. 
 
 
98 Id. (citing EPRI, Investigation of Catalyst Deactivation 
from Operation Below the Minimum Operating Temperature 
(abstract), Product ID: 1023928 (Sept. 11, 2012), available at 
https://www.epri.com/#/pages/product/1023928 [link not 
functioning as of 8/14/2020]). 
99 JA343. 
100 Intervener Br. at 36-39. 
101 JA283. 
102 Response Br. at 35 (emphasis added). 
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Further, the EPA’s own data demonstrates that DEP’s 
argument, and the EPA’s conclusion drawn from it, is 
incorrect. In selecting the threshold, the EPA found 600 
degrees “consistent with the technical limitations of the 
SCR.”103 However, in the same paragraph of its technical 
summary, the EPA admitted that SCR-based pollution controls 
are used in temperatures ranging from 315 to 698 degrees 
Fahrenheit.104 The EPA also offers a telling chart of SCR peak 
performance, which demonstrates that as the reaction 
temperature declines, the efficiency of NOx reduction also 
falls.105 Although it can operate at over 90% efficiency at 750 
degrees, SCR is reduced to approximately 77.5% efficiency at 
600 degrees and 62.5% efficiency at 550 degrees.106 Yet the 
agency fails to provide any information to support the crucial 
next step of its reasoning: whether and how 77.5% compares 
in terms of economic and technical viability with 62.5% 
efficiency.  
 
This Court is left to infer that whereas 77.5% efficiency 
is worthwhile, at 62.5% efficiency, SCR controls no longer add 
value to the pollution control process. That is not an impossible 
conclusion, but there is simply no evidence, nor any effort to 
supply such evidence, in this record. Further, it directly 
contradicts the agency’s suggestion that operating below 600 
degrees “cannot result in lower NOx emissions rates.”107 
 
While this shows that efficiency does decline at an 
increasing rate below 600 degrees, the same is true of 650 
degrees, and 700 degrees. Further, nothing in the record before 
the agency demonstrates why the 65% efficiency at 550 
degrees is inadequate or, in the terms of RACT, economically 
or technologically infeasible. The EPA’s case here boils down 
to showing that there is a general connection between setting a 
limit and lower NOx removal efficiency, which the record 
 
103 JA54. 
104 Id. 
105 Response Br. at 37 (SCR System NOx Removal Versus 
Temperature). 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 35. 
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supports, and then asking us to trust their “technical judgment” 
as to the proper limit.108  
 
While we defer to the agency’s expertise, the agency’s 
decisions must nevertheless be rational and supported by 
record evidence. Here, we have only the agency’s generic 
reliance on “technical expertise” to explain why 600 degrees 
was a rational cutoff.109 Indeed, the EPA points out that 700-
750 degrees is the optimal operating temperature of most SCR 
systems.110 Thus, if the 600-degree cutoff was based upon the 
efficiencies of higher burning temperatures, the selection of the 
cooler, and thus less efficient and “dirtier,” 600 degree 
threshold would be an even greater mystery. We would have 
hoped (and the law requires) that the agency would rely upon 
its technical expertise to justify and explain this decision, not 
to simply adopt it via ipse dixit authority. Moreover, it is 
important to note that the agency neglected to explain why 
Pennsylvania in particular needs this threshold when 
neighboring states have neither requested nor received one. 
Without explaining specifically how the 600-degree threshold 
satisfies RACT, the EPA accepted an arbitrary number 
proposed by PA DEP.  
 
 
108 Id. at 38. By contrast, the EPA is on firmer ground when 
the Sierra Club argues that the EPA has failed to justify the 
30-day averaging period by which emissions are produced.  
Pet. Br. at 33. There the EPA did consider the averaging 
periods in neighboring states and concluded that 
Pennsylvania’s fleet of coal-fired plants and the nature of the 
shorter averaging periods elsewhere (active only during ozone 
season) did not require a change to the Pennsylvania SIP. 
Response Br. at 32; JA77-78. This careful analysis further 
highlights how much was missing from the agency’s 
approach elsewhere. 
109 Response Br. at 38. 
110 JA11 (“NOx removal efficiency decreases more drastically 
when temperatures are lower than the optimal operating 
range,” which is “700° to 750° F”). The EPA also explicitly 
acknowledged in its final approval of the plan that “neither 
Pennsylvania nor EPA explained in detail why the minimum 
SCR temperature exemption . . . is adequate for RACT.” Id. 
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has 
previously rejected similar efforts by the EPA to proceed based 
upon such a “hunch.”111 In Sierra Club v. EPA, the EPA set a 
130-ppm carbon monoxide output limit on certain industrial 
boilers. That was based on data suggesting that at less than 150 
ppm, the benefits of further reduction were negligible.112 
However, the data the EPA used to reach that determination 
had previously been rejected by the agency as unreliable. Thus, 
the D.C. Circuit Court held that the proposed standard was 
arbitrary and capricious. The EPA had relied on the data to 
conclude that further reductions would not be helpful.113 The 
court explained, “even if EPA had grounds to conclude that 
there is some nonzero level of CO emissions that marks a point 
below which [pollution] emissions cannot be further reduced, 
it offered no basis for identifying 130 ppm as that level.”114 
 
Likewise, here the data could support establishing a 
threshold limit, but the agency fails to establish why 600 
degrees suffices whereas 550 or 650 degrees does not. Unlike 
the flawed underlying data rejected by the D.C. Circuit, here 
the EPA fails to provide any uncontradicted data to support its 
threshold limitation. Instead, it summarily concludes that were 
Pennsylvania to institute a 550-degree limit, “additional NOx 
reductions achieved would be marginal.”115 
 
The threshold limit also serves to eviscerate the 
agency’s already flawed 0.12 lb NOx/MMBtu limit discussed 
above. The evidence here establishes that since the SIP took 
effect, the Cheswick power plant appears to have begun using 
the 600-degree threshold as a loophole to avoid activating its 
SCR system.116 At night, when power needs drop and the plant 
can lower its operating temperatures, the emissions at 
Cheswick have not declined commensurately. On the contrary, 
they have soared—up to 0.35 lb NOx/MMBtu—more than 
 
111 Sierra Club v. E.P.A., 884 F.3d 1185, 1198 (D.C. Cir. 
2018). 
112 Id. at 1195. 
113 Id. (“EPA relied on the same data it had elsewhere 
decisively characterized as untrustworthy.”). 
114 Id. at 1197. 
115 Response Br. at 39; JA12. 
116 JA342. 
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three times the daytime emissions. This resulted in the entire 
plant’s average emissions substantially increasing.117 We 
cannot ignore the fact that this increase in polluting emissions 
only started after implementation of the new SIP standard was 
approved.118  
 
The EPA tacitly acknowledged the existence of this 
loophole in its public response to the Sierra Club’s concerns. 
There, the agency tried to argue that there was no loophole 
because the plants must still cap emissions at the higher, non-
SCR limit of 0.16 lb-0.40 lb/MMBtu, depending on the boiler 
type.119 The EPA argues it is thus not a “loophole” but the 
natural result of plants lowering their operating temperatures at 
night due to reduced demand.120 That argument collapses upon 
itself. It is, in fact, describing what can only be defined as a 
loophole. It should be obvious that a loophole need not allow 
plants to escape regulation entirely. Nevertheless, the 
temperature threshold permits plants to evade the lower SCR 
limits of the Pennsylvania SIP. The EPA is thus flatly wrong 
when it concludes that allegations the threshold constitutes a 
loophole are not “supported in theory or fact.”121 Thus, we 
must remand in order for the agency to develop an alternative 
federal implementation plan.122 
C. Reporting Requirement 
 
Finally, the proposed SIP’s lack of a tangible reporting 
requirement is the third chink in the plan’s shoddy enforcement 
regime. In light of this deficiency, the temperature threshold 
exception discussed above becomes even more pernicious. 
Operating in tandem, these two provisions allow plant 
operators to evade the above 0.12 lb/MMBtu limits altogether 
by claiming they were operating below 600 degrees at the time 
 
117 JA341-42. 
118 See JA344-45 (demonstrating the pattern of increased 
emissions after SIP was implemented). 
119 JA12. 
120 Response Br. at 45. 
121 Id. Because these increased emissions started only after the 
SIP’s temperature threshold was implemented, it cannot be 
explained as a necessary byproduct of the plant’s nighttime 
operations. 
122 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1). 
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non-compliant emissions occurred. Without a record of inlet 
temperature data at the time of emission, it will be impossible 
to ascertain the validity of such claims. 
 
The EPA and DEP reject the notion that the reporting 
requirements are insufficient. First, they point to the text of the 
Pennsylvania SIP as incorporated into state regulation. They 
then add many additional details regarding how this statutory 
oversight will be enforced that are nowhere to be found in the 
administrative record. “Our review must . . . be based on ‘the 
administrative record [that was] already in existence’ before 
the agency, not ‘some new record made initially in the 
reviewing court’ or ‘post-hoc rationalizations’ made after the 
disputed action.”123 Thus, we can only consider the record as it 
existed when the EPA issued its approval, not any post-hoc 
justifications offered during the course of litigation. 
 
This means that support for the reporting regime must 
be found in the following requirements, which existed at the 
time of approval:  
The owner and operator of an air contamination 
source subject to this section . . . shall keep 
records to demonstrate compliance [with the 
SIP] in the following manner: (1) The records 
must include sufficient data and calculations 
to demonstrate that the requirements [of the SIP] 
are met. (2) Data or information required to 
determine compliance shall be recorded and 
maintained in a time frame consistent with the 
averaging period of the requirement.124 
 
The parties dispute whether this SIP requirement that 
“sufficient data and calculations” be recorded suffices to 
ensure that temperature records are preserved. The Sierra Club 
argues these terms are too vague to be enforceable. We agree. 
The Clean Air Act requires: “plan provisions shall include 
enforceable emission limitations, and such other control 
 
123 Christ the King Manor, Inc. v. Sec. U.S. Dept. of Health 
and Human Servs., 730 F.3d 291, 305 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting 
Rite Aid of Pa., Inc. v. Houstoun, 171 F.3d 842, 851 (3d 
Cir.1999)) (alterations in original). 
124 25 Pa. Code § 129.100(d) (emphasis added). 
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measures, means or techniques . . . as well as schedules and 
timetables for compliance, as may be necessary or appropriate 
. . .”125 The Sierra Club also complains that the law allows only 
Pennsylvania to request the records;126 there is no provision for 
public insight into how the plants are operating, and therefore 
no way for interested members of the public, or more crucially, 
the EPA itself, to conduct oversight. The absence of public 
access conditions enforcement upon a given administration’s 
approach to enforcement of state environmental regulations. 
We do not believe that Congress intended to tether 
enforcement of the Clean Air Act safeguards to the vicissitudes 
of those political winds.  
 
In New York v. E.P.A., the Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit held that when a state proposal’s lack of sufficient 
reporting requirements prevents the EPA from conducting 
enforcement, a given regime thereby fails to comply with the 
Clean Air Act.127 There, the EPA had approved a reporting 
regime that depended on operators self-identifying a 
“reasonable possibility” of experiencing an increase in 
pollution. It left to the independent hands of those operators 
whether, in fact, they matched that description.128 Therefore, 
operators could freely increase their emissions and avoid 
detection simply by claiming that there was no “reasonable 
possibility” that they would have experienced an increase in 
pollution output. The court concluded, “EPA needs to explain 
how its recordkeeping and reporting requirements allow it to 
identify [noncompliant] sources.”129 The court also expressed 
doubt about an enforcement regime’s “reliance on state 
programs to establish minimum recordkeeping and reporting 
standards.”130 Effective regulation must not depend on the 
candor or veracity of the very entities being regulated. This is 
particularly true under the CAA, where past practices of 
 
125 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(6); see also Reply Br. at 26 (citing 
cases that rejected the EPA’s approval of unenforceable 
standards). 
126 25 Pa. Code § 129.100(i). 
127 413 F.3d 3, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
128 Id. at 34-35. 
129 Id. at 34. 
130 Id. at 35. 
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weighing economic factors have historically counseled against 
complete compliance. 
 
The same logic applies here. First, the EPA delegated 
recordkeeping entirely to Pennsylvania’s internal procedures. 
This delegation failed to require that records be available to the 
public. Instead, it deferred what “data and calculations” were 
“sufficient” for compliance to an operator’s interpretation. 
That “honor code” approach might suffice in the type of world 
we aspire to. But it is more than a little fanciful to base a 
regulatory enforcement regime upon such aspirations.131 
Instead, of requiring a regime that could readily be “policed” 
and enforced, the EPA endorsed an emissions regime with no 
discernible enforcement mechanism. 
 
Anticipating this weakness in their initial argument, the 
EPA and PA DEP offer a second line of justification. They 
provide more detail on how the regulatory regime will 
function. In its brief, DEP explains that under existing state 
law, plant operators are required by their operating permits to 
record their operating temperatures and to preserve those 
records for inspection on request of the state.132 In particular, 
the state describes how “major polluters” under Title V (a 
category into which, it assures us, all of the power plants under 
review fall) are required to maintain and make available 
suitable records for public review and inspection. The Title V 
permitting process itself incorporates the RACT requirements, 
 
131 Moreover, in that aspirational world, regulation would not 
be needed to ensure compliance. As the Founders recognized: 
“[i]f men were angels, no government would be necessary.” 
THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison). Instead, by 
requiring a regime that could readily be “policed” and 
enforced, the EPA endorsed an emissions regime with no 
discernible enforcement mechanism. 
132 Intervener Br. at 54-55 (citing 25 Pa. Code §§ 
127.12(a)(3), 127.411(a)(4)(i), 127.12b(c), 127.441, 
127.442). Intervenors direct us to this and other parts of their 
brief in their 28j letter, but the further explication they 
provide was not present in the record when the EPA issued its 
approval of the SIP and is therefore not a valid basis for our 
decision making now. DEP 28(j) letter dated May 28, 2020 at 
1-2. 
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by making each permitee agree to keep suitable records to 
enforce RACT provisions.133 
 
Yet at oral argument, PA DEP conceded that 
temperature inlet data is not specifically included in these Title 
V permit records. Instead, counsel posited that “if the 
Department has the temperature data, citizens are able to 
review that.”134 This tacitly demonstrates that the data’s 
availability is speculative and dependent on the regulated 
entity. Counsel explicitly confirmed this point. When asked, 
“so sometimes it’ll be there, and sometimes it won’t,” PA 
DEP’s counsel admitted, “that’s correct, Your Honor . . . if the 
Department has records, they must be made available to the 
public.”135 It is a strange regulatory system indeed that is based 
on the good faith of the regulated entity to keep records which 
may be prejudicial to its operation and profitability.  
 
Moreover, the recordkeeping provisions cited by PA 
DEP do not require operators to record temperature inlet 
data.136 Intervenor’s own record cites reveal that PA DEP 
actively removed prior requirements for “how the records shall 
be maintained or in what format[.]”137 And even if this were 
not the case and the EPA had actually submitted after-the-fact 
evidence that temperature inlets were recorded, we would be 
unable to consider that evidence. We are bound to examine 
only “the administrative record . . . already in existence before 
the agency, not some new record made initially in the 
reviewing court or post-hoc rationalizations made after the 
disputed action.”138  
 
Because the SIP’s 600-degree threshold necessarily 
depends upon accurate temperature reporting, the EPA’s 
approval of such inadequate requirements on this record was 
 
133 Intervener Br. at 55 (citing 25 Pa. Code Chapter 127, 
Subchapter G). 
134 Oral Arg. Trans. at 42-43 (emphasis added). 
135 Id. at 43 (emphasis added). 
136 Intervenor’s Br. at 12, 56 (citing 25 Pa. Code §§ 127.511, 
129.100). 
137 JA289. 
138 Christ the King Manor, Inc., 730 F.3d at 305 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). 
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arbitrary and capricious. Thus, the reporting requirements must 
be vacated.  
 
IV. 
 
Therefore, we will grant the petition for review and 
vacate the agency’s action on each of these three provisions of 
the Pennsylvania plan. On remand, the agency must either 
approve a revised, compliant SIP within two years or formulate 
a new federal implementation plan.139 That proposal must be 
technology forcing, in accord with the agency’s RACT 
standard,140 and lack the gaping loophole found in the 
enforcement regime proposed here. 
 
139 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1) (providing two years for the EPA 
to promulgate a federal implementation plan in such 
circumstances); E.P.A. v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 
572 U.S. 489, 498 (2014) (acknowledging this timeline). 
140 Memorandum from Roger Strelow, supra n.10, at 2. 
